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家族企业的公司治理模式——基于契约理论的研究

时间:2012.01.05

徐鹏    宁向东

(清华大学 经济管理学院,北京 100084

 

[  ]西方主流经济学界以大型公众公司为研究对象建立了一套成熟有效的公司治理理论体系,而家族企业的一系列特性决定了其公司治理理论与传统的公司治理理论存在着根本性的差异。该领域至今尚未建立起一个全面系统的理论框架,来解释家族企业公司治理中特殊的逻辑关系和动力机制,尤其是在中国经济社会大背景下的家族企业公司治理研究几乎处于空白。基于委托代理理论构建契约理论模型,既能够对家族企业治理模式做出深入的解析,也有利于构建新的理论思想。通过契约理论模型研究发现,家族委托人可以利用显性的“契约治理”与隐性的“关系治理”相融合的治理系统有效地解决企业内部的委托代理问题,两种治理机制之间具有替代性。这种双系统治理机制可以降低委托代理成本,提高代理人努力水平。研究结果进一步表明家族代理人与职业经理人在不同工作类型下努力程度的差异及其背后的行为动机,进而证实了家族企业公司治理机制存在着独特的合理性和优越性。

[ ]家族企业 公司治理 委托代理理论 契约治理 关系治理

[中图分类号]F276.6         [文献标识码]A

[基金项目]本文受国家自然科学基金项目“公司治理机制的实施程序与方式选择研究”(批准号70672002)的资助

[作者简介] 徐鹏(1986-)男,黑龙江省哈尔滨市人,清华大学经济管理学院博士生研究方向为公司治理、企业理论地址:中国北京市清华大学紫荆公寓14号楼729A100084电话:15811527789。电邮:xup.08@sem.tsinghua.edu.cn

宁向东(1965-)男,吉林省吉林市人,清华大学经济管理学院教授、博士生导师,清华大学公司治理研究中心执行主任,研究方向为公司治理、企业理论。

 

 

The corporate governance mechanism of the family business

——a research based on the contract theory

Xu Peng & Ning Xiangdong

(School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084

Abstract: Based on the large public companies, western economists established the mature and effective theory of corporate governance, but the characteristics of family business determine that they are fundamentally different from the traditional theory. Scholars have not established the comprehensive and systematic theory to explain the special corporate governance mechanism of family businessespecially in the context of Chinese economic. A reasonable explanation can be made by constructing the model of contract theory based on the principal-agent theory. The results of the theory model show that: family principal can use both explicit ‘contractual governance’ and implicit ‘relational governance’ to resolve the problems of the agency, and the two mechanisms are substitute. The family business governance system can reduce the cost of governance, enhance the effort level of the agent, furthermore, such kind of mechanism can only be used on the familial agent. Besides, we also analyzed the two types of agents’ effort under different conditions, which explains the rationality and the superiority of the family corporate governance mechanism.

Key words: family business; corporate governance; principal-agent theory; contractual governance; relational governance

 

 

 


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